Abstract. This paper analyzes the authentication security of lightweight authenticated cipher ACORN, a second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition. We first put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for state collisions of ACORN. Then we point out the errors of the designer's analysis and utilize a reverse derivation method to find proper input differences to the registers which can ensure that the state differences get eliminated in certain rounds. Last but not least, we redefine the differential properties of the overall feedback function to compute the probability of state collisions more precisely and improve the security margin of ACORN given by the designer.
Introduction
ACORN [1] is a binary feedback register based authenticated stream cipher designed by H. Wu and has been selected as a second-round candidate of CAESAR [2] (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness). The designer specifically prohibits the nonce-reuse and decryption-misuse settings in the first version ACORN v1. To provide protection against nonce-reuse in encryption/decryption a tweaked version named ACORN v2 was submitted in September 2015.
Both versions of ACORN use a 128-bit key and a 128-bit IV (initialization vector) to protect up to 2 64 bits of associated data and up to 2 64 bits of plaintext. The designer strongly recommends the use of a 128-bit authentication tag. ACORN contains a 293-bit state consisting of six concatenated LFSRs and the use of bit-oriented registers provides a new approach to design lightweight authenticated ciphers.
Up to now there are some published analyses of ACORN v1, but none of them threatens its security. Liu et al. [3] describe slid properties of keys and IVs for ACORN v1, and propose state recovering attacks using guess-and-determine and differential-algebraic techniques, although the attacks are worse than exhaustive key search. Chaigneau et al. [4] appliy a key recovery attack to ACORN v1 in nonce-reuse and decryption-misuse settings, which is against the security claim of the designer. Salam et al. [5] develop a known-key collision attack on ACORN v1, which is not a feasible attack clearly. Zhang et al. [6] estimate the security margin of ACORN v1 by finding the linear approximations of the output function. This paper mainly focuses on the message authentication security of ACORN v2. We point out and correct the errors of the designer's analysis, presenting a more precise security bound of authentication security by constructing state collisions. For the rest of the paper, we use ACORN to refer the second-round submission ACORN v2.
Description of ACORN
This section gives a brief description of ACORN by defining the functions used in the cipher and introducing different phases. ACORN contains a 293-bit internal state denoted by ,0 ,1 ( , , ,
for the ith step. The state consists of six concatenated LFSRs, as shown in Fig. 1 . 
where the maj function is defined as: 
where ,107 i S denotes the complement value of ,107 i S . In Eq. 3, the ch function is defined as: 
.
The Initialization
The initialization phase consists of injecting the key 0 127
into the state and updating the state for 1792 steps. The pseudo code is given below. 
Note that the designer strongly recommends the use of a 128-bit authentication tag.
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Construction of State Collisions in ACORN
In this section we try to construct state collisions in ACORN. We first study the properties of state update function and put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for state collisions of ACORN. Based on this we utilize a reverse derivation method to find proper input differences to the registers which can ensure that the differences in the state get eliminated in certain rounds. 
From Eq. 6 we get that at least one of the above seven particular stages for the two states has to be different in order to satisfy the condition ii SS   . However, if one of the seven stages is different, the other six stages also have to be different to ensure 11 ii SS    . Namely, the conditions are satisfied and the necessity is proved. □ To attack ACORN authentication the designer injects a difference into the state and manages to eliminate the differences in the register stages by selecting proper input differences. As the designer has explained, the analysis of the difference in associated data and ciphertext are similar, so we regard the feedback bit and the messages bit as a whole. However, the designer makes a slip in writing one of the linear recurrences, leading to an invalid difference which cannot eliminate the state differences. Different from the designer's analysis, we utilize a reverse derivation method to find proper input differences to the registers which can ensure that the differences in the state get eliminated after certain rounds. , , ,
. Then we use a reverse derivation method to determine the input differences of each round i d  . According to the theorem, the state differences at time t-1 are given below: 
Hence we can get 0101 1011 0000 0110 1101 0000 1011 0110 01 Our experiment shows that the difference given by the designer is wrong, which cannot eliminate the internal differences. We also verify that the above input difference can ensure that the states are definitely to collide after 293 rounds of iteration.
Next we have to introduce proper differences by modifying the ciphertext or associated data in order to get the above input difference to the registers. Same with the designer, we analyze the differential properties of the feedback function. Nevertheless, we find that the differential property of ch(x, y, z) described by the designer is incorrect. Besides, the designer analyzes the two nonlinear functions separately, instead of putting them together and resolving differential properties of the overall feedback function, which is also inaccurate. We redefine the differential properties of maj(x, y, z) and ch(x, y, z), as shown in Tab. 1. 
From Table 1 and Eq. 9 we can get that there are eight input differences whose corresponding output differences can be determined with probability 1, while for other input differences the output differences are 0/1 with probability 0.5. With this property and the above input differences to the LFSRs, we program to get that the probability of eliminating the state differences is 2 -181 , which is better than the security margin 2 -189 given by the designer.
Conclusions
ACORN is a lightweight authenticated stream cipher which has been selected as a second-round candidate of CAESAR. The published analyses of ACORN haven't threatened its security up to now. This paper mainly focuses on the message authentication security of ACORN by constructing state collisions. We point out and correct the errors of the designer's analysis, improving the probability of state collisions from 2 -189 to 2 -181 . Note that our results show that ACORN is able to provide 128-bit MAC security and how to attack ACORN effectively is still an open problem for our future work.
